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INSIDE SALT
In-Depth Coverage of Issues Surrounding State and Local Tax
INSIDE SALT
In-Depth Coverage of Issues Surrounding State and Local Tax
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State Revenue Departments Misapplying Federal Tax Law

by | Sep 9, 2014 | , , , , , ,

State income tax laws generally build on federal tax law.  The typical pattern is to begin the calculation of state taxable income with federal taxable income and then to modify it by adding or subtracting items where state tax policies differ from federal tax policies.  As a result, a corporation’s state taxable income can be affected by the application of the federal Internal Revenue Code.  State revenue departments generally do not consider themselves bound by Internal Revenue Service determinations respecting the application of federal tax law and believe that they are free to interpret the Internal Revenue Code as they see fit.  Unfortunately, this has led to problems because state tax auditors often are not well trained in federal tax principles.  We had an instance earlier this year in which an auditor claimed that the merger of a wholly-owned subsidiary into its corporate parent was taxable because there was an increase in the parent’s retained earnings.  The merger was a plain vanilla tax-free liquidation under Sections 332 and 337 of the Internal Revenue Code (there was no intercompany debt and the subsidiary was clearly solvent), but sending copies of these provisions to the auditor left him unmoved.  We finally got him to back down by showing that the parent’s increase in retained earnings was matched by a decrease in the subsidiary’s retained earnings so that there was no overall increase.  As we explained to the client, a win is a win, even if for the wrong reasons.  Nevertheless, if the auditor had been properly versed in the most basic federal corporate tax principles, this exercise would not have been necessary.

Two recent decisions illustrate misapplications of federal tax law by state revenue departments.

The Idaho Tax Commission recently held that a subsidiary’s net operating loss (NOL) carryovers did not pass to its parent in a merger of the subsidiary into the parent.  The parent did not continue to operate the business of the merged subsidiary and the Commission held that “based on IRC §382, the Petitioner cannot carry the loss forward after the merger.”  Idaho State Tax Commission Ruling No. 25749 (Apr. 17, 2014).  The Commission’s statement of federal tax law is incorrect.  Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code does not apply to a merger of a wholly-owned subsidiary into its parent.  Because of constructive ownership rules, no change in ownership is deemed to occur.  Moreover, Section 382 does not prevent an NOL from passing to the surviving company in a merger; it simply limits the extent to which the NOL can be used.  Although it is true that the limitation is zero for years in which the merged company’s business is discontinued, the NOL is not destroyed.  If the parent later sells assets received from the subsidiary that had built-in gain at the time of the merger, the loss can be used to offset the gain.

Discussions that we have had with the Commission after the decision came out indicate that the Commission had [...]

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MTC’s Market-Based Sourcing Recommendations for UDITPA: Too Little, Too Late?

by | Sep 3, 2014 | , , ,

Member states of the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) voted to adopt proposed amendments to Article IV of the Multistate Tax Compact during their annual meeting in late July.  The proposed amendments likely to have the most widespread impact on taxpayers are the amendments to the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA) Article IV section 17 sourcing rules that change the sales factor sourcing methodology for services and intangibles from a costs of performance (COP) method to a market-based sourcing method. 

The MTC’s recommended market approach provides that sales of services and intangibles “are in [the] State if the taxpayer’s market for the sales is in [the] state.”  In the case of services, a taxpayer’s market for sales is in the state “if and to the extent the service is delivered to a location in the state.”  The proposed amendments also provide that if the state of delivery cannot be determined, taxpayers are permitted to use a reasonable approximation.  At this point, there is no additional guidance from the MTC on the meaning of “delivered,” how to determine the location of delivery in the event that a service is delivered to multiple jurisdictions, or what constitutes a reasonable approximation.

While the proposed amendments may be touted by some as the death knell of COP sourcing, for these changes to take effect, they will still need to be adopted individually by legislatures in Compact member states or in any other states that may choose to adopt them.  As we have seen over the last several years, many states have already forged their own paths in this area.  (See our article discussing the wide variety of market-based sourcing rules.)  Moreover, while many states have enacted market-based sourcing provisions with respect to the sale of services, certain states, unlike the MTC proposed amendments, have declined to convert to market-based sourcing for intangibles (e.g., Pennsylvania).

The proposed amendments leave taxpayers with many unanswered questions.  For example, assume a corporate taxpayer (Corporation A) is in the business of offering a payroll processing service.  Corporation A provides this service to Corporation B.  Corporation B’s management of the contractual arrangement with Corporation A occurs in Massachusetts, which is also the location of Corporation B’s human resources function.  Corporation B has 10,000 employees, 2,000 of whom are located in a jurisdiction that has adopted the MTC’s market-based sourcing recommendation (State X).  What portion of Corporation A’s receipts from the performance of its payroll processing service for Corporation B should be sourced to State X?

One can reasonably argue that the service is delivered to Corporation B as a corporation (i.e., that the human resources function is the true beneficiary) and not individually to Corporation B’s employees—leaving State X with nothing.  However, does the MTC’s language “if and to the extent the service is delivered” create an opportunity for State X to argue that it should receive 1/5 (2,000 employees/10,000 employees) of Corporation A’s receipts?

In late August, the MTC launched a project to [...]

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Connecticut Hires Chainbridge Software LLC for Transfer Pricing Training

by and | Aug 21, 2014 | , , , ,

On July 15, 2014, the Connecticut Department of Revenue Services awarded Chainbridge Software LLC a contract worth $50,000 for on-site and remotely supported training for transfer pricing audits.  Chainbridge is infamous for being the contract auditor hired by the District of Columbia Office of Tax and Revenue to manufacture transfer pricing-based assessments.  In 2012, the District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings denounced Chainbridge’s methodology in Microsoft Corp. v. Office of Tax and Revenue.  Numerous other cases are in litigation following D.C.’s refusal to abide by that decision.

We have reviewed the Connecticut request for proposal drafted by the Department of Revenue Services.  While we do not yet have access to the final contract, it will likely be similar to the request for proposal.  The solicitation requests two to three days of training per week over the course of three months.  According to the RFP, Chainbridge will teach the Department’s employees about transfer pricing principles and methodologies, taxpayer planning, economic analysis of transactions between related parties, pre- and post-audit planning, and other related topics.

In light of the Connecticut Department of Revenue Services’ expected contract with Chainbridge, we anticipate that the Department will become more active in evaluating transfer pricing.  What is not certain is whether the analysis will follow the debunked method still being used in D.C.



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If At First You Don’t Succeed, Try, Try Again: Illinois General Assembly Sends Revised Version of Click-Through Nexus Law to the Governor for Signature

by and | Jul 30, 2014 | , , , , ,

In 2011, Illinois became one of the first states to follow New York’s lead by enacting “click-through nexus” legislation.  The Illinois law created nexus for any out-of-state retailer that contracted with a person in Illinois who displayed a link on his, her or its website that had the ability to connect an Internet user to the remote retailer’s website, when those referrals generated over $10,000 per year in sales.  Pub. Act 96-1544, §§5, 10 (eff. Mar. 10, 2011) (codified at 35 ILCS 105/2(1.1) and 35 ILCS 110/2(1.1) (West 2010).  On October 13, 2013, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the click-through nexus law violated the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) by imposing a discriminatory tax on electronic commerce.  Performance Marketing Ass’n v. Hamer, 2013 IL 114496.  The court held that the statute unlawfully discriminated against Internet retailers by imposing a use tax collection obligation based only on Internet referrals but not on print or over-the-air broadcasting referrals.  The court did not reach the question whether the law also violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (although the trial court had also rejected the law on this basis).

In its recently completed Spring 2014 legislative session, the Illinois General Assembly approved an amendment to the click-through law that was designed to correct the deficiencies found by the Illinois Supreme Court.  SB0352 (the Bill).  The Bill expands the definition of a “retailer maintaining a place of business in this State” under the Illinois Use Tax and Service Occupation Tax Acts (Acts) to include retailers who contract with Illinois persons who refer potential customers to the retailer by providing a promotional code or other mechanism that allows the retailer to track purchases referred by the person (referring activities).  The referring activities can include an Internet link, a promotional code distributed through hand-delivered or mailed material or promotional codes distributed by persons through broadcast media.  The Bill goes on to provide that retailers can rebut the presumption of nexus created by the use of promotional codes or other tracking mechanisms by submitting proof that the referring activities are not sufficient to meet the nexus standards of the United States Constitution.  Presumably, under the principles of Scripto and Tyler, if a remote seller can demonstrate that the Illinois referrals are not “significantly associated” with its ability to “establish or maintain” the Illinois market, the presumption will be rebutted.

As amended, the Bill appears to address the ITFA concerns expressed by the Illinois Supreme Court by not singling out internet-type referrals.  It also attempts to resolve any due process constitutional concerns by providing an opportunity for retailers to rebut the presumption of nexus created by their use of referring activities.  The Bill was sent to the Illinois governor for signature on June 27.  The Bill will take immediate effect upon becoming law.

At present, four other states (Georgia, Kansas, Maine and Missouri) have click-through nexus laws that expressly extend the presumption of nexus to non-Internet based referring activities.  [...]

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State and Local Tax Supreme Court Update: June 2014

by and | Jun 25, 2014 | , , , , , , , , ,

On June 10, 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States distributed three state and local tax cases for a conference to be held on June 26, 2014: Equifax, Inc. v. Mississippi Department of Revenue, Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl, and Alabama Department of Revenue v. CSX Transportation, Inc.  The Supreme Court previously agreed to hear Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne and determine whether Maryland’s disallowance of a credit against its county income tax for taxes paid to other jurisdictions violated the Commerce Clause.  We are eager to see if the Court will opt to hear the remaining three cases, clarifying answers to questions in the world of state taxation.

The taxpayer in Equifax filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on February 19, 2014, appealing a decision by the Mississippi Supreme Court.  The state court upheld the Mississippi Department of Revenue’s application of market-based sourcing as an alternative apportionment formula instead of the statutory cost-of-performance sourcing for apportioning the income of Equifax, a credit reporting company.  In making this determination, the court required the Mississippi chancery courts to use a highly deferential standard of review.  The Institute for Professionals in Taxation, the Georgia Chamber of Commerce and the Council On State Taxation filed amicus curiae briefs.

The Direct Marketing Association filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on February 25, 2014.  The Direct Marketing Association seeks review of a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit that held that the Tax Injunction Act barred federal court jurisdiction over the Direct Marketing Association’s challenge to a Colorado sales and use tax reporting law.  The law requires remote sellers that do not collect Colorado sales or use tax and have total annual gross sales in Colorado of $100,000 or more to inform the customer at the time of sale of the customer’s use tax obligation, to send annual notices to customers who purchased $500 or more in goods from the seller and to file a report with the state regarding a customer’s total purchases.  An amicus curiae brief was filed by the Council On State Taxation.  If the Supreme Court were to hear Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl, it would likely clarify the holding of Hibbs v. Winn to better clarify the scope of the TIA’s protection.

On October 30, 2013, the Alabama Department of Revenue filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in CSX Transportation.  The Alabama Department of Revenue is challenging the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision that Alabama’s sales tax on diesel fuel discriminates against rail carriers in violation of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act) because motor carriers and interstate water carriers are not required to pay the 4 percent sales tax.  The Supreme Court had previously issued a 2011 opinion stating that the taxpayer could challenge sales and use taxes under the 4-R Act, but the Supreme Court remanded the case to determine whether the tax was discriminatory.  Amicus [...]

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Retailers Caught in the Middle: To Tax or Not to Tax Delivery Fees

by | Jun 12, 2014 | , , , , , , , ,

Over the past decade we have seen a large increase in the number of third party tax enforcement claims against retailers involving transaction taxes (see Multistate Tax Commission Memorandum regarding survey of class action refund claims and false action claims, dated July 12, 2013, describing such actions).  The lawsuits typically are brought either as proposed class actions, alleging an over-collection of tax, or as whistleblower claims on behalf of state governments, alleging a fraudulent under-collection of tax owed to the state or municipality.  With respect to certain issues, including shipping and handling charges, retailers have been whipsawed with lawsuits alleging both under- and over-collection of tax.

On April 3, a proposed class action lawsuit was filed in Florida alleging that Papa John’s Pizza was improperly collecting tax on its delivery fees (Schojan v. Papa John’s International, Inc., No. 14-CA-003491 (Circuit Court Hillsboro County, Florida)).  The lawsuit is similar to an action filed in Illinois that resulted in an Illinois Supreme Court ruling rejecting a proposed class action claim that a retailer was improperly collecting tax on its shipping charges (Kean v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 919 N.E.2d 926 (Illinois 2009)).

Both Florida and Illinois impose sales tax on services that are inseparably linked to the sale of tangible personal property (see, e.g., 86 Ill. Admin. Code § 130.415(b) & Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 12A-1.045(2)).  The regulations provide that whether a customer has separately contracted for shipping charges, or has an option to avoid shipping charges by picking up the property at the retailer’s location, can be used as a proxy to determine whether the services are separate and thus not taxable (86 Ill. Admin. Code § 130.415(d); Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 12A-1.045(4)(a), (b)).

In Kean, the Illinois Supreme Court held that shipping charges were a taxable part of an internet sale in which the customer had no option but to pay shipping charges.  After the ruling, the Illinois Department of Revenue made no announced change to its commonly understood audit position that sales tax was not owed on separately stated shipping charges that were assessed at a retailer’s actual cost.

Seeking to capitalize on the Kean ruling, an Illinois law firm has filed upwards of 150 lawsuits under the Illinois False Claims Act against retailers that do not collect tax on the shipping and handling charges associated with their internet sales, alleging an intentional failure to collect tax and seeking treble damages, attorneys’ fees and associated penalties.  The suits were filed without regard to whether the retailers had been audited and found not to owe tax on their shipping and handling charges.  The State has declined to intervene in the majority of these cases, permitting the Relator to proceed with the prosecution.  Because the amounts at issue are small (6.25 percent tax on shipping and handling charges), the lawsuits force many retailers to choose between paying an (entirely undeserved) settlement to resolve the litigation or bearing the expense of litigation.  For reasons not entirely clear, the Illinois General Assembly [...]

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You Do the Math: Unclaimed Property Lawsuit Filed Against Kelmar

by , and | Jun 9, 2014 | , , ,

Mark McQuillen, president of Kelmar Associates, LLC, was misinformed when he was quoted as saying “I’ve never been sued” on May 26—less than one week after suit was filed against Kelmar and three Delaware state officials in a Delaware Federal District Court. See 72 State Tax Notes 455 (May 26, 2014). While the timing of this statement was an unfortunate – but likely  honest – mistake, the lawsuit filed by Temple-Inland Inc. asserts the conduct of Kelmar in conducting an unclaimed property audit on behalf of the state of Delaware was anything but.

According to the complaint, Temple-Inland was initially asked to pay over $2 million to the state based on the “fatally flawed” extrapolation methodology used by Kelmar to calculate Temple-Inland’s liability (and Kelmar’s paycheck from Delaware). While the demand was reduced to $1.38 million after the plaintiff initiated administrative review, the result and details of how they got there remains alarming. Of note, Kelmar estimated that nearly $1 million was due to Delaware for the seven-year period of 1986 through 2003 after identifying a single unreported check for $147.30 during a subsequent six-year period (Complaint ¶ 84). The complaint contains countless examples of voided and reissued checks (even checks that escheated to other states) that were used in Kelmar’s extrapolation formula. Ultimately the result for Temple-Inland was a demand from Delaware alone of over $100,000 escheatable for prior year’s accounts payable, despite having only around $15,000 escheatable to all other states on these accounts for a five year period actually reviewed.

Based on these practices, Temple-Inland asserts that Kelmar and the state auditing officials have unconstitutionally applied the amendment to Delaware Escheat Law allowing for estimations of unclaimed property liability to years prior to its enactment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Along those same lines, the state penalized Temple-Inland for failing to maintain records for periods prior to 2010, when a substantive document retention requirement was imposed in the state (see S.B. 272 § 4). Nonetheless, Temple-Inland asserts that the methodology used by Kelmar violates federal common law, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Commerce Clause and Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

The opening brief filed on behalf of Temple-Inland is available here

Practice Note: While Delaware has settled every suit raising these questions and has an economic incentive to keep them from reaching what would likely be an adverse decision to the state’s (and Kelmar’s) financial interest, the discussion should not end there. Temple-Inland Inc. had a long history of solid compliance with the unclaimed property laws across several states, yet still was the target of a flawed and likely unconstitutional audit by Kelmar on behalf of the state of Delaware. The company was forced to hire counsel and litigate against Kelmar’s questionable practices. While two new Delaware bills have been introduced in an effort to eliminate unclaimed property contingent fee auditing practices (S.B. 215 and S.B. 228), holders should stand firm in opposition to Kelmar’s aggressive extrapolation methods and keep [...]

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One Thing’s Consistent—There’s No Duty of Consistency

by | Jun 3, 2014 | , , ,

Taxpayers resisting audit requests for tax returns filed in other states, or requests for details about the treatment of an item in another state, now have another quill in their arsenal besides the 2010 Oregon Tax Court decision in Oracle Corp. v. Dep’t of Rev., 2010 Ore. Tax LEXIS 32 (Or. T.C. 2-11-10).  The New Jersey Tax Court recently issued a letter opinion in Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, Tax Court Dkt. 010589-2010 (May 1, 2014), reiterating that a taxpayer is not required to treat an item in exactly the same way it treats it in another state.

Like Oracle, Elan Pharmaceuticals involves the business/non-business distinction (called the operational/non-operational distinction in New Jersey vernacular).  Apparently, the company reported its gain from the sale of certain operations as business (i.e., “operational”) income on its California Franchise Tax Return, but reported the same gain as nonbusiness (i.e., “nonoperational”) income on its New Jersey Corporation Business Tax Return.  These facts largely mirror those in Oracle, except that the state involved was Oregon, not New Jersey.

During the Division of Taxation’s audit of the company, the gain was recharacterized as business income, which resulted in a substantial deficiency.  While the Division’s position was based on a number of factors, including its determination that the company never ceased conducting the line of business it purportedly disposed of, the Division was clearly influenced by the company’s treatment of the gain in California.  In fact, the Division asserted that because the company treated the gain as apportionable business income in California, it could not treat it as non-apportionable nonbusiness income elsewhere.

Like the Oregon Tax Court, the New Jersey Tax Court rejected such a purported duty of consistency.  The Court stated that a requirement of consistency, while “appealing under pure common sense, and in light of the purpose of the UDIPTA, . . . does not mean that [the company] is barred from seeking application of New Jersey law when challenging a New Jersey tax assessment.”  The Court continued:  “this court should be guided by N.J.S.A. 54:10A-6.1(a), New Jersey’s basis for taxing operational income, and the binding law construing that statute, not the consequent result of such treatment in another State.”

Ultimately, the Tax Court agreed with the Division of Taxation that the company’s gain was apportionable business income, relying largely on the unitary business principle (an aspect of the matter that appears not to have been fully developed on the record or addressed by the parties during briefing).  Still, the Court’s mandate that the actual treatment of an item in another state not be binding for New Jersey purposes is important.  It’s also entirely consistent with another recent Tax Court decision—Lorillard Licensing Co., LLC v. Director, Division of Taxation, N.J. Tax Ct. Dkt. A-2033-13T1 (Jan. 14, 2014), in which the Tax Court determined that whether or not another state actually imposes income tax on receipts is irrelevant for purposes of computing New Jersey’s now-defunct “throw out rule” so long as the other state [...]

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How to Negotiate a Settlement Agreement

by | May 22, 2014 | ,

Settlements of tax audits are typically memorialized in closing agreements between the department of revenue and the taxpayer.  Negotiating these agreements can be an important part of any settlement.

The department of revenue may have standard printed form closing agreements, and the taxpayer should determine the extent, if any, to which the standard form can and should be changed.  If department representatives are reluctant to change the printed form, one possibility would be to add an appendix that elaborates on—and even contradicts—the provisions of the form.

The agreement should indicate whether it is effective with respect to similar issues in future years.  Part of the settlement may be an agreement as to how certain items will be treated in future years; if so, this should be explicitly stated.  On the other hand, if the intent is that the agreement will not govern the treatment of settled items in future years, this too should be explicitly stated.  We have had cases in which this was not made clear, and, when the taxpayer in future years departed from the agreed treatment of certain items, the auditors said that the taxpayer was reneging on a deal.  When the taxpayer pointed out that the agreement specifically said that the settlement was not to apply to future years and did not necessarily reflect the opinions of the parties as to the proper tax treatment of any item, the auditors backed down, but they were still somewhat resentful.  The best approach is to pin down precisely the effect, if any, of the agreement on future years.

The department of revenue may want to provide that it can reopen the audit years if it discovers tax avoidance transactions.  While the auditors are thinking about abusive tax shelters, their suggested language is often broad and can apply to routine business transactions where tax considerations have been taken into account.  One government draft closing agreement that recently crossed our desks would have allowed the department to reopen the audit in the case of any “scheme, product, or transaction structured with the intent of evading or avoiding federal or state taxes.”  This language could apply to the most routine business transactions where taxes were taken into account, such as a decision to sell a business in a tax-free reorganization as permitted by section 368 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) rather than in a taxable sale. Taxpayers should try to limit any such provisions to objectively determinable tax shelters such as “listed transactions” within the meaning of the Code or comparable state law.  While the desire of state tax officials to be able to challenge abusive transactions is understandable, the typical closing agreement occurs only after an audit has gone on for some time and the taxpayer’s books have been carefully checked, so there is no reason why any significant transaction should not have come to light.  The department should not be allowed to reopen an audit or address routine business transactions just because they [...]

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Retailers Should Examine Gift Card Practices in Light of a Recent Unclaimed Property False Claims Action

by | May 14, 2014 | , ,

A complaint in the Superior Court of Delaware alleges that numerous retailers “schemed to deprive the State of Delaware of hundreds of millions of dollars due to the State under the Abandoned Property Law” (emphasis added).  Delaware v. Card Compliant et al., Del. Sup. Ct (New Castle County), Case No. N13C-06-289 FS (6/2013).  The complaint asserts that the retailers were all incorporated in Delaware and, under the second priority rule, unclaimed gift card funds should have been remitted to Delaware after five years of inactivity.  According to the complaint, the defendants attempted to avoid this rule by setting up and using companies incorporated in states that exclude gift cards from the definition of unclaimed property for purposes of gift card issuance and management; however, the arrangements “are without substance as the value of all unredeemed gift cards remains within the possession, custody and control of the Delaware Defendants.”

The financial risk is considerable.  A qui tam lawsuit such as this one allows for triple damages plus a per violation civil penalty of $5,500 to $11,000. The defendants included 15 retailers, primarily restaurants, a third party gift card company and its affiliates, and a trade association that allegedly promoted the gift card company business.  As the action is under Delaware’s qui tam statute, it was filed under seal in June of 2013 and only recently became public.  The defendants are only now becoming aware of the suit.

The complaint is definitely worth reading for anyone involved in gift card unclaimed property issues.  There are several interesting points to note:

  • The original plaintiff bringing the suit (the relator) acted as controller and then vice president of client relations for the original gift card company offering the services to the defendants.  The business was operated out of the relator’s basement.  After the original gift card business was purchased by another company, the relator was a sales and support representative for the business.  The relator appears to have kept records of the company’s business arrangements with the retail defendants and now uses those records to bring a law suit against his former employer’s clients.
  • One of the law firms representing the relator is a well-known political powerhouse in Delaware.
  • The relator has asked for jury trial of this case.

Important take-away issues:   Any company involved in the use of gift cards should take a serious look at this complaint and initiate a review of gift card procedures.  This review should include consideration of the following:

  • If using a gift card company, verify that there is economic substance to the structure.  This applies both to the use of third party providers and captive gift card companies.  While there are certainly legal arguments regarding the level of economic substance necessary, it is better safe than sorry.  Furthermore, for any company relying on a captive gift card company, the risk of a piercing the corporate veil argument (or its equivalent) should be a consideration in how the relationship is structured.
  • Review and strengthen confidentiality [...]

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