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Should Companies Adjust Their Incentive Strategies in Light of New Governmental Accounting Disclosure Requirements?

Earlier this month, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) approved Statement No. 77, Tax Abatement Disclosures, which requires state and local governments to report on foregone revenue from tax abatement agreements. This will significantly increase scrutiny of negotiated tax incentives, particularly at the local level. Businesses need to consider how this may change their local incentive strategies.

To summarize, Statement 77 requires state and local governments to disclose basic information about their current incentive agreements, or other agreements, that reduce tax revenue:

  • Dollar amounts by which the government’s tax revenues were reduced as a result of tax abatement agreements;
  • The name and purpose of each tax abatement program;
  • The specific taxes being abated;
  • The authority under which the tax abatement agreements are entered into;
  • The criteria that make the recipient eligible to receive a tax abatement;
  • The mechanism by which the taxes are abated;
  • The provisions for recapturing abated taxes (e., clawbacks);
  • The types of commitments made by tax abatement recipients; and
  • Any other commitments made by the government as part of the agreements.

For tax abatements where a government has reduced its own revenue, disclosed information should be organized by each major tax incentive program. For incentives where one government’s revenue has been reduced by a different government’s abatement (e.g. a municipal property tax incentive reducing a school district’s revenue), disclosed information is based on the government that entered into the abatement agreement and the type of tax being abated.

Statement 77 permits the reporting government to decide whether to report the required information individually or in the aggregate. If agreements are disclosed individually, the government must establish a quantitative threshold to determine which agreements to disclose—it cannot disclose selectively. A reporting government is permitted to omit specific information if it is legally prohibited from disclosures, such as via state confidentiality laws or a confidentiality provision in the agreement itself.

The disclosure provisions of Statement 77 apply only to tax abatement agreements, which are negotiated agreements where a government agrees to forego tax in exchange for some benefit. Tax incentives that do not require an agreement are not affected. Negotiated grants or other non-tax incentives are also not affected.

Practice Note

Statement 77 will significantly change the world of incentives, particularly at the local level where negotiated agreements reducing property or sales taxes are common. The disclosures of the amounts of forgone revenue associated with tax abatement programs will provide ammunition to groups criticizing incentives, and gone are the days that The New York Times has to spend 10 months gathering state and local incentive data, as they did in 2012. Businesses should expect increased scrutiny during the approval process as governments become more sensitive to whether they are getting a “good deal.” Companies with existing agreements should also be concerned: local governments may seek to renege on their commitments as the costs become more apparent, particularly when new politicians come into office who were not part of the original deal.

One consideration in negotiating incentives [...]

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Tax on Tax Credits: U.S. Tax Court Addresses Federal Taxation of Refundable State Credits in Maines

As more and more states offer refundable tax credits to induce economic development, it is critical for businesses weighing incentive offers to take into consideration the federal income tax implications of an award. While a payment may be called a “credit” and claimed on a state tax return, that payment might nonetheless constitute taxable income for federal tax purposes. Imposition of federal income tax on incentive payments can materially reduce their value and should be considered when weighing the potential benefit of an award. A recent United States Tax Court decision, Maines v. Commissioner, demonstrates that risk.

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Seeing Green: New York’s Reformed Brownfields Cleanup Program Creates Opportunities for Redevelopment to Generate Refundable Tax Credits

Now is the time to begin brownfield redevelopment projects in the State of New York. Reauthorization of and reforms to New York’s Brownfields Cleanup Program, which provides tax credits to redevelop contaminated properties, came into effect on July 1, 2015. The program has been reauthorized until 2026, giving businesses and developers a chance to remediate brownfields while generating millions of dollars in refundable credits.

State brownfield tax credit programs encourage remediation of contaminated property that might otherwise remain abandoned. New York, with its industrial heritage, has more than its share of such locations. The Brownfields Cleanup Program was started in 2003 as a way to encourage redevelopment of these properties. Once a participating project is granted a certificate of completion, it generates credits calculated as percentages of the site preparation costs and groundwater remediation costs, and of the costs of tangible property (buildings and capital equipment). The site preparation and groundwater remediation costs are the environmental expenses, which generate credits ranging from 22 to 50 percent of costs. The tangible property costs are the redevelopment (generally non-environmental) expenses, which generate credits ranging from 10 to24 percent of costs. Tangible property credits are capped as a multiplier of site preparation and groundwater remediation costs: three times the costs for most projects and six times the costs for manufacturing projects. All brownfields credits are refundable to the extent that they exceed the taxpayer’s income tax or franchise tax otherwise due. Essentially, under the Brownfields Cleanup Program, New York will pay for up to half of a project’s environmental remediation costs and a quarter of other redevelopment costs.

In recent years, the program came under criticism for allegedly excessive credit awards, which sometimes exceeded the overall costs of remediation. The program had been scheduled to expire at the end of the year, and a short-term extension of the program through March 2017 was vetoed by Governor Cuomo as not providing needed reform. The reforms package and reauthorization were enacted with the FY 2016 budget. L. 2015, ch. 56, pt. BB (S. 2006-B / A3006-B). With proposed regulations for some definitional terms pending, the reformed law came into effect for projects approved by the Department of Environmental Conservation on or after July 1, 2015. Preexisting projects are grandfathered in under the old provisions as long as they are completed by the end of 2019 (and projects approved before June 23, 2008, must be completed by the end of 2017). New projects will have until March 31, 2026, to obtain certificates of completion under the reformed Brownfields Cleanup Program.

Key reforms coming into effect include the following:

  • To address a sense that projects do not need as many incentives in the tight New York City real estate market, projects in the city now have to meet one of three special criteria to qualify for the tangible property component of the credits. This special requirement is for tangible property credits only; site preparation and groundwater remediation credits are unrestricted. The three [...]

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Illinois Circuit Court Dismisses Challenge to Retained Job EDGE Credits

Corporations with Illinois Economic Development for a Growing Economy (EDGE) credit agreements giving credit for retained jobs can breathe a sigh of relief: The litigation challenging the state’s ability to grant EDGE credits for retained jobs has been dismissed by an Illinois Circuit Court.

Illinois EDGE credits are discretionary income tax credits awarded by the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity (DCEO). The credits are generated as a percentage of employee wage withholding. Sometimes DCEO has awarded credits for retained jobs as well as new jobs.

Back in January 2015, the Liberty Justice Center, acting on behalf of several taxpayers, filed a complaint alleging that it was illegal for Illinois to give credits for retained jobs. Jenner v. Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity, No. 15-MR-16 (Cir. Ct. 7th Jud. Cir., Sangamon Cty.). The plaintiffs’ theory was that the EDGE credit statute authorized awards only for new jobs, and thus DCEO’s regulation allowing credits for retained jobs exceeded statutory authorization.

In March 2015, the state moved to dismiss for lack of standing. The plaintiffs claimed that they had standing as taxpayers challenging illegal use of state funds, but the Circuit Court now has agreed with the Attorney General: on May 12, 2015, the motion to dismiss was granted. The plaintiffs plan to appeal the decision.

This ruling is in line with the general trend of rejecting taxpayer standing in challenges to tax credit programs, including economic development tax credits. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006); Arizona Christian School Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).




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Owens-Brockway, VWS, and the Problem of 100% Clawbacks After Partial Performance of Economic Development Incentive Agreements

Economic development incentives are, at heart, contracts: a government offers to provide certain benefits-tax credits, grants, abatements, etc.-in exchange for a business creating jobs and investing capital. Agreements are often long-term, lasting a decade or more. Naturally, economic and political circumstances can change during such a length of time.

Two recent cases, Owens-Brockway and VWS, illustrate the unfairness that occurs if a company ceases performance of its agreement near the end of the term of its agreement, only to have the government claw back the entire value of the award. Businesses entering into incentive agreements should carefully consider these risks.

Sometimes a retrospective clawback is required by law and must be accepted as a condition to the award, but in other instances it may be negotiable. Additionally, if a business is facing a 100% clawback after partial performance, it should consider potential claims to challenge the 100% clawback or to receive compensation for the jobs and investment that it did create.

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From Handshake to Ribbon Cutting: Lessons in Implementing Economic Development Incentives that Avoid Clawbacks

Once an incentive agreement is in place, it is time for the company to get to work building and staffing the new or expanded facility. While the economics of a deal are typically still on track, the initial buildout/expansion can raise issues that may not have been anticipated during the negotiation process, such as construction delays, interim hiring or how to calculate average salaries of new employees. As these questions arise, it is critical to work collaboratively with the development agency to ensure maximum value to the recipient business.

An all-too-typical problem is construction delays. An incentive proposal or application will usually include a construction schedule. The planned construction benchmarks included in the proposal then become performance requirements in the incentive award agreement. After the agreement is signed, unforeseen delays arise such that the business cannot meet the specified timeline. Economic development agencies are typically understanding about delays and will be open to renegotiation as long as the project is still on track. Still, it is best to address these issues proactively before the target is missed. In many instances an agency can provide more relief if the issue is addressed before the deadline passes and a technical breach may have occurred.

One silver lining of addressing construction delays with a development agency is that the agency may help solve the problem causing the delay. Particularly if the delays are being driven by a governmental inspection or permitting process, the development agency will often have contacts with political leadership and management at the agency causing the delay. Using these contacts can be very effective in facilitating resolution of any regulatory or permitting hold-up.

Another issue that comes up is the question of counting interim job growth. Once a company commits to a location, it typically is enthused to begin hiring employees, even if the expanded or new facility is not yet ready. New job qualification criteria for purposes of the incentive, however, often include location and start date requirements that can unduly restrict qualification of new jobs. That is particularly the case where jobs transferred intrastate do not count toward performance. For example, new jobs initially housed in a temporary off-site office while construction is pending could face a risk of being considered transferred jobs (i.e., not “new” jobs) that do not qualify. Additionally, start dates can be an issue: A company may be eager to begin hiring after an initial letter of intent or government offer, but an incentive agreement often only counts jobs created after it is signed and in effect. Where the demands of the business world require quick execution, it is problematic to have a delay of months for an agreement to be signed and approved before a business can begin counting new jobs.

A corollary issue to consider is how to define what compensation types are available to use to meet negotiated average salary targets, particularly for mid-year hires.  For example, consider that a salaried employee may not have a full year of wages in [...]

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Inside the New York Budget Bill: Sales Tax Provisions

The New York Legislature has passed bills related to the 2015–2016 budget (S2009-B/A3009-B and S4610-A/A6721-A, collectively referred to herein as the Budget Bill) containing several significant “technical corrections” to the New York State corporate income tax reform enacted in 2014, along with sales tax provisions and amendments to reform New York City’s General Corporation Tax.

This post is the seventh in a series analyzing the New York Budget Bill, and summarizes the sales tax provisions in the Budget Bill.

Dodd-Frank Act Relief Provisions

The Budget Bill includes provisions that provide relief from potential sales and use tax implications arising from compliance with certain requirements of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (commonly referred to as Dodd-Frank).  Under Dodd-Frank, large financial services organizations must develop and implement resolution plans allowing for an orderly wind-down of their banking and broker/dealer operations in the event of an adverse financial event, such as another financial crisis.  The affected financial services organizations and their regulators have agreed in principle to plans where front-office and back-office assets and operations would be segregated into separate legal entities.  As a result, many affected financial services organizations are implementing plans whereby back-office functions are being placed into separate bankruptcy remote legal entities as a way to ensure that an orderly wind-down of the affected entities could occur, with the back-office functions remaining available to all potentially affected entities.

Without the relief provided by the Budget Bill, the Dodd-Frank-mandated reorganizations could have resulted in increased New York sales tax compliance burdens and increased New York sales tax liabilities, both upon the reorganization itself and on an ongoing basis.  Many transactions that formerly occurred between different units within the same legal entity (and hence were not subject to sales tax) will have to occur between different legal entities after the restructurings and thus will be taxable.  To prevent this increase in sales tax burdens and liabilities, an exemption was inserted into the Budget Bill that will apply to sales of property or services that are entered into or conducted as a result of the resolution planning required by Dodd-Frank, so that the affected companies are not subject to sales or use tax on transactions that occur solely as a result of their compliance with a federal law that has been put in place to make the global financial systems safer.

The exemption provided by the Budget Bill is tied to the status of the buyer and the seller as a “covered company” or “material company” as defined in section 243.2(l) of the Code of Federal Regulations, which is one of the sections implementing the Dodd-Frank Act.  Under the exemption, sales of tangible personal property or services among related parties are exempt from the New York sales and use tax if the vendor and the purchaser are referenced as either a “covered company” or a “material entity” in a resolution plan (or the vendor and the purchaser are separate legal entities pursuant to a divestiture authorized by the Dodd-Frank [...]

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Inside the New York Budget Bill: Net Operating Losses and Investment Tax Credit

The New York Legislature has passed bills related to the 2015–2016 budget (S2009-B/A3009-B and S4610-A/A6721-A, collectively referred to herein as the Budget Bill) containing several significant “technical corrections” to the New York State corporate income tax reform enacted in 2014, along with sales tax provisions and amendments to reform New York City’s General Corporation Tax.  The Budget Bill’s technical corrections to last year’s corporate income tax reform include changes to the economic nexus, tax base and income classification, tax rate (including clarifications to rules applicable to certain taxpayers, such as qualified New York manufacturers), apportionment, combined reporting, net operating loss and tax credit provisions.  The technical corrections are effective on the same date as last year’s corporate income tax reform, which was generally effective for tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2015.

This post is the sixth in a series analyzing the New York Budget Bill, and discusses changes to the net operating loss (NOL) and investment tax credit provisions.

Net Operating Losses – Prior NOL Conversion Subtraction

For tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2015, the calculation of the New York NOL deduction has changed dramatically.  As a result, the Tax Law provides for a transition calculation, a prior NOL Conversion Subtraction, for purposes of computing the allowable deduction for NOLs incurred under the prior law.

To calculate the Conversion Subtraction, the taxpayer first must determine the amount of NOL carryforwards it would have had available for carryover on the last day of the “base year”—December 31, 2014, for calendar year filers, or the last day of the taxpayer’s last taxable year before it is subject to the new law—using the former (i.e., 2014) Tax Law, including all limitations applicable under the former law.  This amount is referred to as the “unabsorbed NOL.”  Second, the taxpayer must determine its apportionment percentage (i.e., its BAP) for that base year (base year BAP), again using the former (i.e., 2014) Tax Law; this is the BAP reported on the taxpayer’s tax report for the base year.  Third, the taxpayer must multiply the amount of its unabsorbed NOL by its base year BAP, then multiply that amount by the tax rate that would have applied to the taxpayer in the base year (base year tax rate).  The resulting amount is divided by 6.5 percent (qualified New York manufacturers use 5.7 percent).  The result of these computations is the prior NOL Conversion Subtraction pool.

A taxpayer’s Conversion Subtraction will equal a portion of its Conversion Subtraction pool computed as outlined above.  The standard rule provides that one-tenth of the Conversion Subtraction pool, plus, in subsequent years, any amount of unused Conversion Subtraction from prior years, may be deducted as the Conversion Subtraction.  The Tax Law as originally drafted also provided that any unused Conversion Subtraction could be carried forward until tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2036 (tax year 2035 for calendar year filers).  The technical corrections include slight changes to that carryforward provision.  Now, any unused Conversion [...]

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Inside the New York Budget Bill: Tax Rates and Qualified New York Manufacturers

The New York Legislature has passed  bills related to the 2015–2016 budget (S2009-B/A3009-B and S4610-A/A6721-A, collectively referred to herein as the “Budget Bill”) containing several significant “technical corrections” to the New York State corporate income tax reform enacted in 2014, along with sales tax provisions and amendments to reform New York City’s General Corporation Tax.  The Budget Bill’s technical corrections to last year’s corporate income tax reform include changes to the economic nexus, tax base and income classification, tax rate (including clarifications to rules applicable to certain taxpayers, such as qualified New York manufacturers), apportionment, combined reporting, net operating loss and tax credit provisions.  The technical corrections are effective on the same date as last year’s corporate income tax reform, which was generally effective for tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2015.

This post is the third in a series analyzing the New York Budget Bill, and discusses changes to the tax rates and to the qualified New York manufacturer provisions.

Qualified New York Manufacturers

Effective for tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2014, qualified New York manufacturers are subject to a 0 percent business income tax rate and to beneficial rates for purposes of the tax on business capital and the fixed dollar minimum tax.

Under the original corporate tax reform provisions enacted in 2014, a “qualified New York manufacturer” is a manufacturer (either a single taxpayer or a combined group) that meets two qualifications.  First, it has property in New York that is described in section 210-B.1 of the Tax Law (i.e., property that is eligible for the investment tax credit), and either (1) the adjusted basis of such property for federal income tax purposes at the close of the taxable year is at least $1 million, or (2) all of its real and personal property is located in New York.  Second, it is principally engaged in qualifying activities (e.g., manufacturing, processing or assembling) (the “principally engaged” test).

A taxpayer—or, in the case of a combined report, a combined group—that does not satisfy the principally engaged test may still be a qualified New York manufacturer if the taxpayer or the combined group employs during the taxable year at least 2,500 employees in manufacturing in New York, and has property in the state used in manufacturing, the adjusted basis of which for federal income tax purposes at the close of the taxable year is at least $100 million.

The technical corrections in the 2015 Budget Bill restrict the types of property eligible for consideration in the principally engaged test to property mentioned in Tax Law section 210-B.1(b)(i)(A) (property that is principally used by the taxpayer in the production of goods by manufacturing, processing, assembling, refining, mining, extracting, farming, agriculture, horticulture, floriculture, viticulture or commercial fishing), rather than property described in the entirety of section 210-B.1.  This correction mirrors the definition of eligible property before the 2014 law changes.

The technical corrections also contain an important clarification with respect to the application of the qualified New [...]

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U.S. Tax Court Finds Refundable State Credits Result in Taxable Income

The United States Tax Court recently determined that certain refundable tax credits issued by New York in connection with economic development activities (EZ Credits) constituted taxable income to the recipients for federal tax purposes. Maines v. Comm’r, 144 T.C. No. 8 (Mar. 11, 2015). In reaching this determination, the Court noted that the characterization of certain of the EZ Credits as refundable taxes for New York purposes “is not necessarily controlling for federal tax purposes;” instead, the Court looked at the substance of the EZ Credits and determined that the credits were not actually a refund of previously paid state taxes, and, instead, the credits were a taxable accession to wealth since they were “just transfers from New York to the taxpayer—subsidies essentially.” The Court also considered one other refundable tax credit (the QEZE Credit), which was a credit against income tax liability for the amount of real property taxes paid, and determined that, while the amount of QEZE Credits refunded did not constitute a “taxable accession to wealth” as did the EZ Credits, the application of the tax benefit rule mandated that the refundable portion was subject to federal taxable income.

The taxpayers received the EZ Credits from New York for engaging in specific economic development activities in the state through their pass-through business entities. As the Court noted, New York labels the EZ Credits “credits” and treats them as refunds for “overpayments” of state income tax; the taxpayers in Maines received refunds of their state income tax based on their claim for the EZ Credits. Despite New York’s characterization of the EZ Credits, the Commissioner asserted that they were nothing more than cash subsidies, and thus should be treated as taxable income to the taxpayers. On the other hand, the taxpayers argued that New York’s label of the EZ Credits as overpayments was binding for purposes of federal law. The Court, noting President Lincoln’s famous quip that “if New York called a tail a leg, we’d have to conclude that a dog has five legs in New York as a matter of federal law. . . . Calling the tail a leg would not make it a leg,” agreed with the Commissioner, observing that federal law looks to the substance of legal interests created by state law, not to the labels the state affixes to those interests.

As for the QEZE Credit, the Tax Court agreed that it did not result in a taxable accession to wealth since it was really a refund of real property taxes that the taxpayer had paid to the state. However, the Court still determined that the refunded amounts would be taxable due to the tax benefit rule to the extent that a deduction had been claimed for the real property taxes paid. Under the tax benefit rule, to the extent a taxpayer obtains a refund of payments for which it received a tax benefit (such as a deduction), such refund should be taxable.

The Maines decision is one of the first Tax [...]

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