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Should I Register in South Dakota?

Introduction

On March 22, 2016, South Dakota Governor Dennis Daugaard signed into law Senate Bill 106, which requires any person making more than $100,000 of South Dakota sales or more than 200 separate South Dakota sales transactions to collect and remit sales tax. The requirement applies to sales made on or after May 1, 2016.

The law clearly violates the physical-presence requirement under Quill, and that’s precisely what the legislature intended. The law is intended to force a challenge to the physical presence rule as soon as possible.

The South Dakota Department of Revenue (Department) has begun taking steps to enforce the law. We are aware that remote sellers recently received letters from the Department giving the sellers a deadline of April 25, 2016 to either register with the state and commit to collection, or notify the Department that the seller does not meet the law’s gross receipts/sales transactions thresholds. If the seller does neither of these things, South Dakota will assume that the seller does not intend to comply and that South Dakota may initiate legal action against the seller under the new law.

Remote sellers who have received these letters, as well as any other remote sellers who have exposure under the new law, are probably looking for answers to one question: Should we register and begin collecting? There are two important issues to discuss in determining whether to comply: (1) retroactivity and (2) refunds. (more…)




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Viral Marketers Beware – In Alabama, Sales Tax Nexus Created for Out-of-State Bookseller Even Though In-State Teachers Not Acting on Behalf of Seller

After a quarter of a century, the school book nexus cases continue to proliferate, delight and mystify.  The latest installment in the saga is from Alabama.  Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. 2931 v. State Of Alabama Department Of Revenue, Ala. Tax Tribunal, Dkt. No. S. 14-374 (March 25, 2016).  Like the other cases, the question addressed is whether a vendor with no property or employees in the state nevertheless has nexus for sales tax collection purposes because of the activities of unrelated, and uncompensated, teachers in the state.  Like all of the other cases, these teachers received unsolicited catalogs from the vendor and could either discard the materials or distribute them to their students.  Like all of the other cases, if a teacher elected to distribute the materials, the teacher collected completed order forms and payments from the students and mailed the order and payments to the vendor.   Like all of the other cases, the teacher distributed the order once received to the individual students that placed orders.  Also, like all of the other cases the vendor provided bonus points to teachers based on the dollar amount ordered.  The vendor intended the bonus points be used to purchase additional classroom materials – either from the vendor directly or through gift cards to another retailer.

In reaching its decision, the Alabama Tax Tribunal (the Court) restricted its analysis to the historical Quill physical presence standard.  While noting that on the same facts courts in other states have been severely split on the issue of whether physical presence existed for such a vendor, the Court determined that the opinions finding physical presence were more persuasive.  The Court quoted at length from Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue Servs., 38 A.3d 1183 (Conn. 2012).

As with most of the other bookseller cases in which a court found substantial nexus existed, the Alabama Tax Tribunal focused on the Scripto language negating the importance of labels such as “agent,” “independent contractor,” and “representative.”  This is a red-herring, as the correct analysis should be that regardless of the label, on whose behalf were the teachers acting.  Evidence was introduced that the teachers were acting on behalf of their students, not the vendor.  The Court, however, assumed this bedrock issue away by finding that regardless of on whose behalf the teachers were acting, because the teachers’ activities were substantially associated with Scholastic’s ability to establish and maintain a market in the state, this result was sufficient to establish physical presence for the vendor.  According to the Court, it did not matter that the teachers did not receive any type of compensation from the vendor and did not intend to benefit the vendor.  The only thing that mattered to the nexus analysis was that at the end of the day, the teachers were important to Scholastic’s maintenance of a market in the state.

But that cannot be the correct analysis.  Otherwise, any advertising campaign that relied on word-of-mouth (and similarly any viral marketing campaign) would establish nexus [...]

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Financial Statement Countdown for Remote Sellers Selling into Alabama

Remote sellers making sales into Alabama have until January 1, 2016, to begin collecting sales tax regardless of their physical presence in the state or consider whether there is any impact on financial statement issues as a result of non-collection.

This summer, the Alabama Department of Revenue issued a surprising new regulation, § 810-6-2-.90.03. This rule specifically provides that a remote seller with more than $250,000 of sales into the state that also meets the provisions of the “doing business” statute must register for a license and collect and remit sales/use tax to the state. Notably, the list of activities that are considered “doing business” includes solicitation of sales using cable television advertising; substantial solicitation of sales plus benefitting from any banking; financing; debt collection; telecommunication; or marketing activities occurring in this state; any contact with the state sufficient to allow Alabama to impose a sales and use tax collection requirement under the U.S. Constitution. Ala. Code § 40-23-68(b)(9). The rule goes into effect January 1, 2016.

If this had happened 10 years ago, the response would be simple – Alabama’s economic nexus threshold is clearly unconstitutional under Quill. However, several developments, both legal and environmental, have made the analysis more complex. First, the Alabama legislature has provided an option to remote sellers to use the “Simplified Sellers Use Tax Remittance” process. This program creates almost the simplest tax calculation and remittance process possible: one rate, no exemptions, single jurisdiction filing. Alabama is surely counting on the Supreme Court of the United States to find that this simplified process removes the burden which concerned the Court in Quill. There are, of course, numerous arguments against this scenario; many of them quite strong. Nevertheless, Alabama’s clever, parallel compliance juggernaut does mandate some respect.

Second, Justice Anthony Kennedy clearly feels it is high time for the holding in Quill to be relegated to an era when only academics knew of the internet. One justice’s comments do not mean that sculptors should begin carving Quill’s headstone, but the Court already has at least two justices that do not believe the dormant commerce clause exists at all. Today, there is clearly the highest risk ever of some type of melting of the Quill iceberg.

So what does this mean for remote sellers with Alabama customers?  First—of course such sellers could begin collecting, but, some sellers philosophically believe in the underpinnings of Quill and other sellers may find collection, even under the simplified system, financially oppressive and/or administratively difficult. For those sellers that will not or cannot comply, the immediate questions that must be answered are: (1) What are the risks of not collecting; and (2) Do those risks rise to the level of financial statement issues?  Obviously the first risk is that with every sale, the seller may be incurring tax liability that it otherwise could have passed on to its customers. How real this risk is dovetails with the second issue. In determining the risk of probable loss (or other financial statement standard), [...]

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NYS Tax Department Revised Sales Tax Publication Answers Some Questions but Not Others

The New York State Department of Taxation and Finance (Department) has just revised its Guide to Sales Tax in New York State, Publication 750.

The Guide will be particularly useful for companies that are just starting to do business in New York State. It provides a well-organized and easy-to-read outline of the steps that should be taken to register as a vendor selling products that are subject to the sales tax and to collecting and remitting taxes. Small businesses and their advisors will find the Guide particularly useful.

The Guide confirms the State’s required adherence to the United States Supreme Court decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota (a case in which the taxpayer was represented by McDermott Will & Emery) to the effect that an out-of-state company must have a physical presence in New York to be required to collect use tax on sales to New York customers. It confirms that a company need not collect use tax on sales to New York buyers if its only contact with the State is the delivery of its products into the State by the U.S. Postal Service or a common carrier. It cautions, however, that use tax must be collected if the company has employees, sales persons, independent agents or service representatives located in, or who enter, New York. Although the law has been clear for many years that a sales representative can create nexus for an out-of-state company even though he or she is an independent contractor and not an employee, some companies still seem to be under the mistaken impression that this is not the case. Moreover, although there is no New York authority directly in point, cases in other states have established the principle that nexus can be created by the presence in the state of a single telecommuting employee, even if the employee’s work is not focused on the state.

The Guide contains a cryptic reference to New York’s click-through nexus rule under which an out-of-state company can be compelled to collect use tax on sales to New York purchasers if people in the state refer customers to the company and are compensated for doing so. Such persons are presumed to be soliciting sales for the company and, although the presumption can be rebutted, that will prove to be impossible in the vast majority of cases. The Guide contains cross-references to Department rulings that explain the presumption and the manner in which it can be rebutted, but it would have been helpful if the Guide could have provided more detail about these rules.

One attractive feature of the Guide is that people accessing it online can use links in the Guide to get to relevant rulings.

In addition to the state-wide sales and use tax, special sales taxes that are imposed only within New York City are discussed. These include taxes on credit rating services and certain localized personal services such as those provided by beauty salons, barber shops, tattoo parlors and tanning [...]

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Remote Transactions Parity Act Introduced in the U.S. House

Today, Representative Jason Chaffetz introduced H.R. 2775, the Remote Transactions Parity Act of 2015 (RTPA), in the United States House of Representatives (House).

The RTPA addresses the Internet sales tax issue using the structure of the Marketplace Fairness Act (MFA), which passed the Senate in 2013 and was re-introduced earlier this year. Although the RTPA retains many of the features of the MFA, it adds protections for remote sellers and certified software providers.

MFA Authorization Framework Retained

Like the MFA, the RTPA creates two paths for states to impose sales and use taxes on remote sellers. Through the first path, states that are members of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA) are authorized to impose sales and use tax collection requirements on remote sellers. Under the second path, a state that is not a member state under the SSTUA would also be authorized to collect and remit sales and use taxes on remote transactions if it implements certain simplification requirements and protections for remote sellers and certified software providers. Many of these are carried over from the MFA, notably: (1) destination sourcing for interstate transactions; (2) a single entity for administration of sales and use tax; (3) a single audit of remote sellers per state; (4) a single return per state; (5) uniform tax base for all state and local sales taxes within the state; and (6) relief for errors, including remote sellers being relieved of errors made by a certified software provider or the state itself, and certified software providers being relieved of errors made by a remote seller or the state itself. Like the MFA, the RTPA would be effective one year from enactment, but not during the period from October through December in the year following enactment.

Changes

The RTPA contains several notable differences from the MFA, discussed below.

Small Seller Exception

Under the MFA, there is a fixed exception for small sellers and states are not authorized to impose a sales and use tax on small sellers, defined as remote sellers making sales of $1 million or less.

Under the RTPA, the small seller exception starts off larger, and subsequently phased out. In the first year, the exception applies for sellers making sales of $10 million or less. In the second and third year, the threshold is $5 million and $1 million, respectively. The exception goes away in the fourth year. Furthermore, under the RTPA sellers utilizing an electronic marketplace are not considered small sellers and are not entitled to the exception, no matter the year.

Protections to Sellers and Certified Software Providers

The RTPA provides additional protections for remote sellers and certified software providers.  The RTPA contains a mechanism to make sure that a state is not authorized to impose a sales and use tax collection requirement on remote sellers until it has certified multiple software providers, and those providers are certified in all other states seeking to impose authorization requirements. This is to ensure that a remote seller can [...]

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SCOTUS: Colorado Notice and Reporting Challenge Not Barred by the Tax Injunction Act

The United States Supreme Court released a unanimous decision today holding that the Tax Injunction Act (TIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1391, does not bar suit in federal court to enjoin the enforcement of Colorado notice and reporting requirements imposed on noncollecting out-of-state retailers. See Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, No. 13-1032, 575 U.S. ___ (March 3, 2015), available here. These requirements, enacted in 2010, require retailers to (1) notify Colorado purchasers that tax is due on their purchases; (2) send annual notices to Colorado customers who purchased more than $500 in goods in the preceding year, “reminding” these purchasers of their obligation to pay sales tax to the state; and (3) report information on Colorado purchasers to the state’s tax authorities. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-112(3.5). The TIA provides that federal district courts “shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law.”

The Court’s Opinion

The Court held that although the notice and reporting requirements are part of Colorado’s overall assessment and collection process, none of the requirements constitute an “assessment,” “levy,” or “collection” within the meaning of the TIA. Specifically, the Court looked to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to determine that the terms are “discrete phrases of the taxation process that do not include informational notice or private reports of information relevant to tax liability.” See Slip Op. at 5-8 (noting that no “assessment” or “collection” within the meaning of the IRC occurs until there is a recording of the amount the taxpayer owes the Government, which the notice and reporting requirements precede).  Justice Thomas, who authored the opinion, concluded that “[t]he TIA is keyed to the acts of assessment, levy, and collection themselves, and enforcement of the notice and reporting requirements is none of these.” Id. at 9.

The Court rejected the Tenth Circuit’s reliance on (and expansive interpretation of) the term “restrain” in the TIA.  Justice Thomas explained that such a broad reading of the statute would “defeat the precision” of the specifically enumerated terms and allow courts to expand the TIA beyond its statutory meaning to “virtually any court action related to any phase of taxation.” Id. at 11.  Instead, he assigned the same meaning to “restrain” that it has in equity for TIA purposes, which is consistent with its roots and the Anti-Injunction Act (the TIA’s federal counterpart).  Therefore, the Court concluded that “a suit cannot be understood to ‘restrain’ the ‘assessment, levy or collection’ of a state tax if it merely inhibits those activities.” Id. at 12.

The Court’s decision took “no position on whether a suit such as this one might nevertheless be barred under the ‘comity doctrine,’” under which federal courts – as a matter of discretion, not jurisdiction – refrain from “interfering with the fiscal operations of the state governments in all cases where the Federal rights of persons could otherwise be preserved unimpaired.” Id. at 13. The Court left it to the Tenth Circuit on remand [...]

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You Do the Math: Unclaimed Property Lawsuit Filed Against Kelmar

Mark McQuillen, president of Kelmar Associates, LLC, was misinformed when he was quoted as saying “I’ve never been sued” on May 26—less than one week after suit was filed against Kelmar and three Delaware state officials in a Delaware Federal District Court. See 72 State Tax Notes 455 (May 26, 2014). While the timing of this statement was an unfortunate – but likely  honest – mistake, the lawsuit filed by Temple-Inland Inc. asserts the conduct of Kelmar in conducting an unclaimed property audit on behalf of the state of Delaware was anything but.

According to the complaint, Temple-Inland was initially asked to pay over $2 million to the state based on the “fatally flawed” extrapolation methodology used by Kelmar to calculate Temple-Inland’s liability (and Kelmar’s paycheck from Delaware). While the demand was reduced to $1.38 million after the plaintiff initiated administrative review, the result and details of how they got there remains alarming. Of note, Kelmar estimated that nearly $1 million was due to Delaware for the seven-year period of 1986 through 2003 after identifying a single unreported check for $147.30 during a subsequent six-year period (Complaint ¶ 84). The complaint contains countless examples of voided and reissued checks (even checks that escheated to other states) that were used in Kelmar’s extrapolation formula. Ultimately the result for Temple-Inland was a demand from Delaware alone of over $100,000 escheatable for prior year’s accounts payable, despite having only around $15,000 escheatable to all other states on these accounts for a five year period actually reviewed.

Based on these practices, Temple-Inland asserts that Kelmar and the state auditing officials have unconstitutionally applied the amendment to Delaware Escheat Law allowing for estimations of unclaimed property liability to years prior to its enactment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Along those same lines, the state penalized Temple-Inland for failing to maintain records for periods prior to 2010, when a substantive document retention requirement was imposed in the state (see S.B. 272 § 4). Nonetheless, Temple-Inland asserts that the methodology used by Kelmar violates federal common law, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Commerce Clause and Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

The opening brief filed on behalf of Temple-Inland is available here

Practice Note: While Delaware has settled every suit raising these questions and has an economic incentive to keep them from reaching what would likely be an adverse decision to the state’s (and Kelmar’s) financial interest, the discussion should not end there. Temple-Inland Inc. had a long history of solid compliance with the unclaimed property laws across several states, yet still was the target of a flawed and likely unconstitutional audit by Kelmar on behalf of the state of Delaware. The company was forced to hire counsel and litigate against Kelmar’s questionable practices. While two new Delaware bills have been introduced in an effort to eliminate unclaimed property contingent fee auditing practices (S.B. 215 and S.B. 228), holders should stand firm in opposition to Kelmar’s aggressive extrapolation methods and keep [...]

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One Thing’s Consistent—There’s No Duty of Consistency

Taxpayers resisting audit requests for tax returns filed in other states, or requests for details about the treatment of an item in another state, now have another quill in their arsenal besides the 2010 Oregon Tax Court decision in Oracle Corp. v. Dep’t of Rev., 2010 Ore. Tax LEXIS 32 (Or. T.C. 2-11-10).  The New Jersey Tax Court recently issued a letter opinion in Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, Tax Court Dkt. 010589-2010 (May 1, 2014), reiterating that a taxpayer is not required to treat an item in exactly the same way it treats it in another state.

Like Oracle, Elan Pharmaceuticals involves the business/non-business distinction (called the operational/non-operational distinction in New Jersey vernacular).  Apparently, the company reported its gain from the sale of certain operations as business (i.e., “operational”) income on its California Franchise Tax Return, but reported the same gain as nonbusiness (i.e., “nonoperational”) income on its New Jersey Corporation Business Tax Return.  These facts largely mirror those in Oracle, except that the state involved was Oregon, not New Jersey.

During the Division of Taxation’s audit of the company, the gain was recharacterized as business income, which resulted in a substantial deficiency.  While the Division’s position was based on a number of factors, including its determination that the company never ceased conducting the line of business it purportedly disposed of, the Division was clearly influenced by the company’s treatment of the gain in California.  In fact, the Division asserted that because the company treated the gain as apportionable business income in California, it could not treat it as non-apportionable nonbusiness income elsewhere.

Like the Oregon Tax Court, the New Jersey Tax Court rejected such a purported duty of consistency.  The Court stated that a requirement of consistency, while “appealing under pure common sense, and in light of the purpose of the UDIPTA, . . . does not mean that [the company] is barred from seeking application of New Jersey law when challenging a New Jersey tax assessment.”  The Court continued:  “this court should be guided by N.J.S.A. 54:10A-6.1(a), New Jersey’s basis for taxing operational income, and the binding law construing that statute, not the consequent result of such treatment in another State.”

Ultimately, the Tax Court agreed with the Division of Taxation that the company’s gain was apportionable business income, relying largely on the unitary business principle (an aspect of the matter that appears not to have been fully developed on the record or addressed by the parties during briefing).  Still, the Court’s mandate that the actual treatment of an item in another state not be binding for New Jersey purposes is important.  It’s also entirely consistent with another recent Tax Court decision—Lorillard Licensing Co., LLC v. Director, Division of Taxation, N.J. Tax Ct. Dkt. A-2033-13T1 (Jan. 14, 2014), in which the Tax Court determined that whether or not another state actually imposes income tax on receipts is irrelevant for purposes of computing New Jersey’s now-defunct “throw out rule” so long as the other state [...]

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